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Abstract: Concerns about the functioning of food supply chains have been raised by the European
Commission over past years, calling for more effective and coordinated action by National
Competition Authorities (NCAs). To fill this knowledge gap, an equilibrium displacement model
is used to screen conduct along the supply chain, combining the advantages of asymmetric price
transmission (APT) studies and structural models. The test was carried out on the Italian fluid milk
supply chain following market monitoring action by the NCA. Three periods (1996–2003; 2000–2008
and 1996–2008) have been examined, finding imperfect competition over 1996–2008 and 2000–2008,
while no conclusions may be drawn over the time span 1996–2003. In the testing process, the model’s
peculiarities and certain limitations emerged, and related suggestions for its improvement are
discussed. This approach may be used as a preliminary “fast” test for competition policy screening, as
a complement to other methodologies. However, further theoretical and empirical model validation
is necessary.
Keywords: conduct screening; oligopoly; oligopsony; price transmission; vertically related markets
1. Introduction
The food industry and food retailing have witnessed a continuous process of concentration in
many European countries over the last few decades [1], and this phenomenon has raised concerns
among public authorities and governments regarding potential anti-competitive behaviours along
food supply chains. Such issues result from, amongst other sources, oligopolistic and oligopsonistic
power, which may be exerted within agrifood systems at food processing and at retailing stages to the
detriment of farmers (suppliers of raw agricultural inputs) and consumers [2–4]. For these reasons,
a vast amount of research has been carried out by agricultural (and non-agricultural) economists to
analyse anti-competitive behaviours in agrifood markets using different methodological approaches
that can roughly be classified into two broad categories: asymmetric price transmission (APT) studies
and new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) models.
Following the suggestion provided by Digal and Ahmadi-Esfahani [5] on market power analysis
in food retailing, and taking into account recent considerations of Lloyd [6] on price transmission
analysis, the aim of this paper is to identify and apply a methodology able to combine the advantages
of the aforementioned approaches to test conclusively for the exertion of market power along the
whole food supply chain using easily available data. What seems to be the more appropriate theoretical
background for this purpose began with McCorriston et al. [7,8] and was then developed and
adapted by Lloyd et al. [9–11] with empirical application to some food supply chains in the UK
(hereinafter referred to as the McCorriston–Lloyd approach). It is worth highlighting that on the
competition policy side, such a “supply chain approach” would be particularly useful in the light
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of the Communication from the European Commission “A better functioning food supply chain in
Europe” [12,13], which calls, inter alia, for more effective and coordinated action by NCAs. This work
applies the McCorriston–Lloyd approach to the Italian fluid milk supply chain over three time periods
(1996–2003; 2000–2008 and 1996–2008) following market monitoring action by the NCA [14]. The
empirical implementation of the model provides evidence of its peculiarities and limitations, based on
which indications for model testing and improvements are suggested.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section, the literature review,
provides a brief treatment of existing methodologies for the analysis of imperfect competition in food
chains, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses and providing a rationale for using the theoretical
model adopted. The following section describes the McCorriston–Lloyd approach, representing the
reference framework for the empirical analysis. The next section describes the construction of the
dataset and time series stationarity tests. The econometric strategy employed in the empirical analysis
and consequent results are presented. The final section draws the main conclusions and provides
suggestions for future research.
2. Literature Review
This section gives a brief illustration of the principal approaches adopted to examine the presence
and the extent of imperfect competition at different levels of analysis. In line with previous studies [5],
the main objective is to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of each group of methodologies
rather than giving an exhaustive review of the relevant literature. The end of the section summarizes
and compares the focal features of each approach, pointing to the McCorriston–Lloyd approach as a
unifying framework to examine market power along food chains. The discussion of asymmetric price
transmission (APT) studies draws heavily on the survey by Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel [15],
taking into account the suggestions provided by Lloyd [6], whereas that on new empirical industrial
organization (NEIO) structural models takes as its reference point the contribution of Perloff et al. [16].
2.1. Asymmetric Price Transmission (APT) Studies
Economic theory recognizes in the price mechanism a key role for carrying signals among
economic agents about the relative scarcity of goods and factors in a certain market to ensure an efficient
allocation of resources. It is also of paramount importance that price signals are correctly transmitted
among markets related horizontally (same good or factor in different places or countries) and vertically
(a good in a market is a factor in the subsequent one). An incorrect or incomplete transmission of prices
in vertically related markets may give rise to a double concern, both for academics and consumers.
On the one hand, imperfect price transmission may represent an inconsistency for economic theory,
as shown by the exhaustive empirical work carried out by Peltzman [17], while on the other hand, it is
often considered as evidence of anti-competitive behaviour, and, sometimes, it has been employed in
comparison with Antitrust intervention on anti-competitive practices along the agri-food chain [18].
For this reason, a remarkable amount of work has been done on this topic, with particular reference to
vertically related markets such as food supply chains.
For the most part, these studies look for asymmetries between input (farm) and output (consumer)
price movements in vertically related markets; in this context, there is asymmetry when an increase
(decrease) in an input price is fully passed on to the output price, while a decline (rise) in the former
is transmitted incompletely to the latter. Asymmetries can be classified according to the nature of
incomplete transmission [15]—in the rapidity or size of the price adjustment—and the direction of
asymmetry [17]. According to the second criterion, there is positive APT when (assuming causality
from input to output prices) food prices adjust incompletely to farm price increases (positive variation)
rather than to their fall. In the reverse case, negative APT takes place when the imperfect transmission
from input to output price pertains only to decreases in farm prices (negative variation). Empirical
analyses on price dynamics along food chains may differ according to the degree of homogeneity
or differentiation of the product based, for instance, on quality certification [19]. Considering the
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marketing margin [20,21] as the difference between output and input prices, and taking into account
that exogenous shocks may reverse the causality pricing so far assumed (flowing from farm to
food prices), a more general and appropriate definition would be that positive APT allows for a
complete transmission of margin-reducing price movements, whereas negative APT happens when
margin-stretching price signals are fully passed through the marketing chain [15].
What is more important for competition policy purposes is to establish unambiguously what
causes ATP in vertical marketing chains; in spite of the vast amount of work done on the topic,
different determinants are suggested by many authors, without a reference framework able to unify
contrasting explanations [22]. Market power exertion in one or more intermediate stages of the food
marketing chain is pointed to as a cause of APT [22–27] to the detriment of suppliers of raw agricultural
products and food consumers. However, the causal relationship between imperfect competition and
APT is not theoretically grounded [5,22,28,29]. According to Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel [15],
testing this kind of relationship is not easily feasible as it would require meta-analysis using evidence
from previous studies on different supply chains in different countries to capture the treatment effect
of imperfect competition on price transmission. In any case, the lack of homogeneity among the
econometric techniques employed in each piece of empirical research would mean that the data and
results would not be comparable. The only empirical work that overcomes such limitations is that
by Peltzman [17], which analysed price transmission in a wide range of vertically related markets
using the same econometric methodology. However, in this case, market power exertion in each
vertical chain was proxied using a market concentration index (Hirschman–Herfindahl) to gather
cross-sectional evidence on the effect of imperfect competition on APT. Such an approach relies on
the structure–conduct–performance paradigm which has been criticized as it assumes a one-way
relationship from structure to performance and does not take into account simultaneity bias and
the endogeneity of market structure [30–32]. On the same premise, Bakucs et al. [33] undertook
a meta-analysis of the relationship between price transmission and market structure in agro-food
markets, recognizing that concentration measures approximate only the potential for the exertion of
market power and not actual conduct. It seems, once again, that the causation of APT by imperfect
competition cannot reliably be tested. On the theoretical side, Gardner [20] developed a farm–retail
supply chain equilibrium displacement model, assuming perfect competition in the intermediate stage
and constant returns to scale; the model indicates a higher effect of food demand shifters compared to
farm supply shifters on the marketing margin. Using numerical simulations based on the same model,
Kinnukan and Forker [23] found that the elasticity of price transmission differs according to the side of
the shift, suggesting that this could lead to APT. This would mean that APT can take place without
imperfect competition in the intermediate stages of the supply chain, even if von Cramon-Taubadel [34]
suggests that in this context APT would only be apparent. Following the Gardner framework,
McCorriston et al. [7,8] and Weldegebriel [35] have shown that imperfect competition can reduce price
transmission elasticity, but different conditions in the elasticity of substitution and returns to scale may
either amplify or offset the market power effect. This implies that if processing and retailing markets
are imperfectly competitive but show high elasticity of substitution and increasing returns to scale,
such technology and cost conditions can compensate for the market power effect, yielding symmetric
price transmission along the marketing chain. In this case, the presence of APT would not be a viable
tool for detecting the exertion of market power along food chains.
In addition to the aforementioned criticisms of the market power–APT hypothesis, other causes
of asymmetric adjustment of price movements are found in the literature, such as menu-repricing
costs [17,36–39]; inventory costs, especially at the retail level [40]; inflation [41]; and policy intervention
in farm prices in the US [23] and in Europe [42,43]. Even if some of these causes may lead to short-term
APT, it would be harmless for social welfare [15], giving rise to the idea that imperfect competition
cannot be the only determinant of APT.
To summarize what has been reported so far, the APT approach presents the advantage of using
easily available data on farm and consumer price movements to examine and gain insights into the
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dynamics of the whole food supply chain. In doing so, all the vertically related stages within the
marketing (farming, processing, wholesaling and retailing) chain are analysed. However, for a number
of theoretical and empirical reasons, the presence of APT cannot represent conclusive evidence of
market power exertion in one or more stages of the marketing chain analysed.
2.2. New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) Structural Models
The broad category of new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) models was born as a
consequence of dissatisfaction with the structure–conduct–performance paradigm (Sheldon and
Sperling 2003). In their simpler versions, NEIO models are usually aimed at testing for the presence of
market power exertion or to estimate its extent at the market level and not along the entire food chain;
they differ according to the side of the market analysed (product supply or factor demand, measuring,
respectively, oligopolistic or oligopsonistic power), the kind of product examined (homogeneous
vs. differentiated), the estimation strategy adopted (parametric vs non-parametric model), and the
repetition of interactions among economic agents (static vs. dynamic models).
For clarity (and to provide a better explanation of the theoretical approach adopted later),
oligopolistic power in a static, parametric and homogeneous product setting is exerted when sellers
increase product prices above the marginal cost (MC). Unfortunately, firms’ marginal costs are difficult
to observe but can be estimated by exploiting the different revenue functions of firms under different
market structures. In fact, under perfect competition, a firm’s selling price (P) equals its marginal
revenue (MR), whereas under monopoly, the single seller represents the entire market supply and
therefore its marginal revenue decreases as the product quantity (Q) increases: MR = P + Q(dP/dQ),
where dP/dQ is the amount of price decrease for an additional unit of product sold on the market.
Both the previous expressions can be generalized in a single revenue function: MR = P + θ Q(dP/dQ),
where θ represents a conduct parameter, ranging from 0 to 1, measuring the extent of oligopolistic
power. There is perfect competition when θ = 0 or monopoly when θ = 1; more generally, θ > 0
indicates the exertion of oligopolistic power (note that a symmetric explanation may be provided for
oligopsonistic power exerted on the demand side for raw agricultural products). In empirical terms, θ
and the marginal cost are estimated using a simultaneous equation model composed of optimality
conditions (by equating MR and MC functions) and the market demand function [16]. To set up such a
model, data on product price and quantity, demand shifters (i.e., consumer income, price of substitutes)
and supply shifters (i.e., factor prices) are needed. Note that such a procedure allows estimation of the
degree of market power only on one side (supply) of one stage within a supply chain.
In their more complex versions, NEIO models analyse the extent of oligopolistic and oligopsonistic
power on more stages of the marketing chain [44,45], estimating market power for each stage of the
supply chain, but presumably at the cost of increasing demand for data and econometric sophistication.
Another notable recent development pertains to the contribution of Grau and Hockmann [46], that
starting from a NEIO model, developed a set of two price equations in order to test successive
oligopsony power in the German dairy chain
As NEIO models are rooted in economic theory, findings on the extent of market power exertion
derived from their use are more conclusive and reliable than those of APT studies [28] even if there are
some criticisms regarding their accuracy [47]; however, their requirements in terms of the quantity and
quality of data and econometric efforts increase with model complexity (single stage vs. multi-stage).
The two groups of models (APT and NEIO) share in some way the same objective—to test or
estimate market power exertion, even if the results of APT models are not conclusive—but they
operate at different levels, use different kinds of data and provide different findings; to make the
detection of market power exertion in agrifood systems more effective for competition policy purposes,
it is desirable to integrate such approaches [5]. As previously stated, such an objective requires a
methodology that unifies the advantages and addresses the limitations of APT and NEIO models to
test conclusively the exertion of market power along the whole food supply chain. The search for such
a methodology should begin from the first model, describing explicitly the functioning of a vertically
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related supply chain [20], even if assuming perfect competition in the intermediate stage. McCorriston
and others [7,8] adapted the model, allowing for market power exertion within the marketing chain,
variable elasticity of substitution and non-constant returns to scale to derive the elasticity of price
transmission under different conditions. Lloyd and others [9–11] built on this framework, developing
(and applying) a theoretical model able to detect market power exertion along the food chain.
Such contributions are not unique; indeed, Reference [48] (and successively also Fulton and
Tang [49]), following Wohlgenant [50], modified the Gardner model, relaxing the assumption of
perfectly competitive behaviour to test the effect on the farm-retail price spread (and then to check
for market power exertion). Both of the approaches use conduct parameters to allow for imperfect
competition along the food chain, but only the latter explicitly considers the entrance of new firms.
However, the method used by Holloway [48] is more demanding in terms of data for the empirical
application, as it requires time series data for prices and quantities (of raw agricultural products),
whereas the McCorriston–Lloyd model needs time series of prices (or price indices) supplemented
by other easily available data (proxies of marketing costs, demand and supply shifters). From the
perspective of data requirements, the latter approach is preferable when data on product quantities
are not easily available. Perhaps for this reason, such a methodology has been employed in many
countries [27,51–57]. Recently, Kinnucan and Tadjon [58] developed a framework to test for perfect
competition, claiming its advantages against that of Lloyd et al. [11]. Unfortunately, this approach
requires farm and retail absolute prices, while often only index prices are available in many countries.
In this context, the framework developed by Grau and Hockmann [46] may be considered a useful
integration into the “first-pass” test used in the present contribution. The present paper contributes to
the current literature by checking for the presence of imperfect competition in the Italian fluid milk
chain, applying the McCoriston-Lloyd model over a time span posterior to the market monitoring
action by the NCA.
3. Theoretical Model
The McCorriston–Lloyd model used for the analysis is a modification of the Gardner [20]
equilibrium displacement model; whereas Gardner considered the effect of various shifters (farm
input supply and food retail demand) on the farm-retail price spread (difference between retail price
and farm-gate price), assuming perfectly competitive markets, the framework presented here relaxes
this assumption and allows for imperfect competition along the food chain, introducing two conduct
parameters of oligopolistic and oligopsonistic power. In doing so, a reduced form equation is derived
to test for the presence (and not to measure the extent) of imperfect competition along the food
chain; in the equation, the variable affecting the marketing margin differs according to the values of
the conduct parameters or, in other words, according to the presence of anti-competitive behaviors
along the food supply chain. For simplicity, in this paper the intermediate stage of the food chain is
considered as an aggregate of the food processing and retailing sectors. For the sake of brevity, the full
derivation of the theoretical model is presented in Appendix B.
The following equation describes how various exogenous shocks affect the marketing margin in
the presence of perfect competition or when market power is exerted along the food chain:
Px − Pa =
D( θb + gµ) + (1+ bg)(y + zE) + (
θ
b + gµ)cN − (θ + bgµ)(h + gW)
(1+ θ) + bg(1+ µ)
(1)
where Px is the retail price, Pa is the farm gate price of the agricultural product, and their difference
is the price spread (or marketing margin). The equation accounts for the various parameters of the
retail demand function (D, b, c) and of the supply function of the agricultural product (h, g). Attention
is paid to the exogenous shifters, both on the demand side (N) and on the supply side (W), that may
displace market equilibria. The equation accounts also for the non-agricultural marketing costs of
transport, processing and retailing. Such costs have a fixed component (y) and a variable component
(zE). To test the exertion of market power along the chain (whatever is the stage in which it is exerted)
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the equation embodies an oligopolistic (θ) and oligopsonistic (µ) conduct parameter. When both
parameters are equal to zero, the food supply chain is perfectly competitive, while if θ or µ are different
from zero, the market power is exerted at some intermediate stage of the chain. In this framework,
such parameters (and then the competitive behavior) are not directly observed, but are inferred by the
effect of marketing costs and exogenous shifters on the marketing margin.
Note that if the intermediate stage of the supply chain exerts neither oligopolistic (θ = 0) nor
oligopsonistic power (µ = 0), Equation (1) collapses into a simpler form, representing the marketing
margin under perfect competition:
Px − Pa = y + zE = M (2)
Based on the model findings, two important points can be made; first, under perfect competition
along the food chain, the price spread (Px − Pa) is represented only by marketing costs (M) and second,
it is not affected by shifts in the farm supply (W) and consumer demand (N) functions. However, if
oligopolistic or oligopsonistic power is exerted along the food chain (i.e., if θ or µ differ from zero),
both of the exogenous shifters (W and N) affect the magnitude of the price spread. In particular, under
anticompetitive behaviour, a shift in consumer demand (N) increases the margin, whereas a shift in
farm supply (W) reduces it. Note that if market power is exerted within the food chain, both of the
shifters affect the margin simultaneously. The effect of the exogenous shifter on the marketing margin
is then “activated” by the exertion of oligopolistic or oligopsonistic power in the intermediate stage of
the chain.
Based on (1) and (2), we use the following unrestricted equation (including the exogenous
variables W and N) to test two different (null) hypotheses of perfect competition or of market
power exertion:
Px = β0 + β1Pa + yβ2M + β3N + β4W (3)
Under perfect competition along the food chain (θ = µ = 0), none of the shifters affect the margin
and the associated parameters are expected to not differ much from zero. An additional prerequisite,
consistent with economic theory and with Equations (1) and (2), is that the retail price has to be
positively related to both the producer price (β1 > 0) and marketing cost (β2 > 0) in the long term,
and the associated parameter estimates should be positive and statistically significant. Thus, perfect
competition can be tested as follows:
H0 pc : β1  0; β2  0; β3 = β4 = 0 (4)
Note that whereas by failing to reject the null hypothesis we can conclude that the supply chain
is perfectly competitive, rejection of the null hypothesis is not a sufficient condition to deduce the
exertion of market power (although in conventional hypothesis testing, this would be the case).
To reach such a conclusion, some additional conditions are required; first, both of the parameters have
to be significantly different from zero (β3 6= 0; β4 6= 0), and second, the parameter of exogenous shifter
N has to be positive (β3 > 0) while the parameter of W has to be negative (β4 < 0). Similarly, market
power exertion along the food chain is tested under a different null hypothesis:
H0mp : β1  0, β2  0; β3  0; β4 ≺ 0 (5)
In the interpretation here (which differs slightly from the version of the authors who developed
and implemented the model), only empirical results failing to reject H0pc (perfect competition) or H0mp
(market power exertion) can be considered plausible and conclusive. Alternative hypotheses (only one
of the shifters significant and/or not signed according model prescriptions) would yield ambiguous
and inconclusive results.
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4. Data and Methodology
The Italian fluid milk supply chain was screened for the exertion of market power; in addition
to following up the market monitoring action by the NCA [14], the choice was also made to provide
a better fit with model restrictions (input–output coefficient equal to one). In what follows, the first
subsection describes the dataset and the second treats the tests carried out on each time series.
4.1. Description of Dataset
To apply the theoretical model, 29 time series were used within three different datasets (called
respectively A, B and AB), covering partially or totally overlapped time periods (January 1996 to
October 2003 for database A; January 2000 to October 2008 for database B; January 1996 to October
2008 for database AB) using monthly data from publicly-available national data sources: Istat, Conistat,
Coeweb and Ismea. All the data are made available in index form (in each time series, all the values
have been divided for the average value of a base year-1995 or 2000—and then multiplied by 100)
and refer to the retail milk price; the producer milk price (also proxied by producer animal price and
producer import milk price indices); the index of wages in dairy processing (as a proxy of marketing
costs); retail price indices for all goods, food, food and alcoholic beverages (as a proxy of demand
shifters); and the farm input price index (as a proxy of the farm supply shifter). The names of the
variables, abbreviations, sources and manipulations are reported in Table 1, while Appendix A reports
summary statistics for each dataset (Tables A1–A3).
Some concerns may be raised regarding the use of producer and retail price indices from different
statistical sources (Istat and Ismea respectively) or approximating the producer price using the index
of a broader category (animal products). Unfortunately, the available data are not homogeneous
(producers and retail price indices) either in terms of statistical source or level of aggregation; to exploit
all the available statistical information where possible, the original time series have been lengthened
by rescaling the missing period of the same series with another basis. This operation was performed
extending those time series with both of the base indices (1995 = 100 and 2000 = 100) using one or
more overlapping period between two series for the same variable (for instance producer milk price
based on 1995 and 2000). In particular, the choice was made to maximize the number of rebased series
where possible to increase the probability of finding a combination of variables fitting both model
requirements (see end of previous section) and the restrictions imposed by the econometric estimation
strategy (see next section on Error Correction Model). Clearly, the extensive use of rescaled time series
allows for the examination of a longer period, but it may give rise to concerns about the impact of data
manipulations on the reliability of empirical results.
In other words, rescaled time series contain non-genuine information in their rebased parts.
To find a balance between such points, the adopted strategy was to separate the variables into two
“genuine” datasets (A and B) containing mainly non-rebased variables and confining rebased time
series to another (longer) dataset (AB): rebased variables are denoted by the last letter that indicates
their basis (A for 1995 and B for 2000), preceded by a number indicating the overlapping period
used for the rebasing (from 1 to 5), while “genuine” (non-rescaled time series) are denoted only
by the letter that identifies their basis. Demand and supply shifter variables are exceptions to the
aforementioned rules.
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Table 1. Variables description and data sources.
Variable Abbrev Data Description Source Base Year = 100 Period Elaborations
Retail Milk price RM1 Consumer Price Index: milk Istat 1995 96.1–09.3 genuine data
Produc. Milk Price PMA Producer Price Index: cow milk Ismea 1995 95.1–03.10 genuine data
Produc. Milk Price PMB Producer Price Index: cow milk Ismea 2000 00.1–09.2 genuine data
Produc. Milk Price PM1A Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled Ismea 1995 95.1–09.2 rescal 00.1–03.10
Produc. Milk Price PM2A Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled Ismea 1995 95.1–09.2 rescal 00.1–00.12
Produc. Milk Price PM3A Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled Ismea 1995 95.1–09.2 rescal 01.1–01.12
Produc. Milk Price PM4A Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled Ismea 1995 95.1–09.2 rescal 02.1–02.12
Produc. Milk Price PM5A Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled Ismea 1995 95.1–09.2 rescal 03.1– 03.10
Produc. Milk Price PM1B Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled Ismea 2000 95.1–09.2 rescal 00.1–03.10
Produc. Milk Price PM2B Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled Ismea 2000 95.1–09.2 rescal 00.1–00.12
Produc. Milk Price PM3B Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled Ismea 2000 95.1–09.2 rescal 01.1–01.12
Produc. Milk Price PM4B Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled Ismea 2000 95.1–09.2 rescal 02.1–02.12
Produc. Milk Price PM5B Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled Ismea 2000 95.1–09.2 rescal 03.1–03.10
Produc. Anim Price PAPA Producer price Index: animal products Istat 1995 95.1–04.12 genuine data
Produc. Anim Price PAP1A Produc. Pric. Ind.: animal products—rebas Istat 1995 95.1–08.12 rescal 04.1–04.12
Produc. Anim Price PAPB Producer price Index—animal products Istat 2000 00.1–08.12 genuine data
Produc. Anim Price PAP1B Produc. price Index: anim products, rebas Istat 2000 95.1–08.12 rescal 04.1–04.12
Import Produc. Milk IPMA Index of milk import price from EU 25 Coeweb 1995 93.1–09.3 Indexed price €/kg
Import Produc. Milk IPMB Index of milk import price from EU 25 Coeweb 2000 93.1–09.3 Indexed price €/kg
Marketing Shifter MA Index of wages, dairy processing sector Conistat 1995 96.1–02.12 genuine data
Marketing Shifter MB Index of wages, dairy processing sector Conistat 2000 96.1–08.12 genuine data
Marketing Shifter MA1 Index of wages, dairy processing sector Conistat 1995 96.1–08.12 rescal 98.1–98.12
Demand Shifter DS1 Consumer Price Index: general index Istat 1995 96.1–09.03 genuine data
Demand Shifter DS2 Consumer Price Ind: general index-no tobacco Istat 1995 96.1–09.3 genuine data
Demand Shifter DS3 Consumer Price Index: food, wines and spirits Istat 1995 96.1–09.3 genuine data
Supply Shifter SS1 producer price index for dairy farms Ismea 1998 94.1–08.10 Correc techn progr
Supply Shifter SS2 producer price index for dairy farms Ismea 1995 94.1–08.10 Correc techn progr
Supply Shifter SS3 producer price index for dairy farms Ismea 1995 94.1–06.1 genuine data
Supply Shifter SS4 producer price index for dairy farms Ismea 2000 00.1–08.10 genuine data
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4.2. Time Series Stationarity Tests
The use of time series for the empirical analysis requires some preliminary tests on their properties;
Equation (3) cannot be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression unless all the time
series used are stationary [22,59,60], that is, having constant statistical properties (mean, variance
and covariance). According to Granger and Newbold [61], an OLS regression with non-stationary
variables leads to unreliable estimates, resulting in spurious regression. A stationary variable is said to
be integrated of order zero, I(0); when a nonstationary variable became stationary after differencing
(subtracting from each value xt the previous value, xt-1), it contains a unit root, or is integrated of order
one, I(1). Thus, the test for the exertion of market power using OLS regression requires that all the time
series used are stationary in level; if this condition is not satisfied, other estimation procedures should
be used, provided that all the variables employed are I(1). To fulfil these requirements, all the time
series in each dataset were tested for stationarity in level and in first differences looking for their order
of integration. Stationarity was tested using the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test [62] and the
Phillips–Perron (PP) test [63] which takes nonstationarity (presence of a unit root) as the null hypothesis
against the alternative of stationarity. Furthermore, variables in level and first differences were also
tested using the Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test [64], which assumes stationarity as
the null hypothesis against non-stationarity as the alternative hypothesis. Results of stationarity tests
for all the variables (both in level and in firs difference) of each dataset are available in Supplementary
Materials. In each test, an underlying data-generating process was assumed with the variable having,
respectively, intercept and time trend and intercept only. Judgments about the order of integration of
each variable were made comparing t-statistics (for ADF), adjusted t-statistics (for PP) and Lagrange
multiplier statistics (for KPSS) with critical values for each distribution (at 1%, 5% and 10%). For the
ADF and PP tests, the estimation output also provided probabilities of unit roots. As results can differ
among the tests and can be sensitive to functional form specification (intercept with or without trend),
the decision was made to consider stationary in level those variables with low probability (p < 5%)
of acceptance of the null hypothesis in at least one specification of the ADF and PP tests, and at the
same time a probability greater than 5% of accepting the null hypothesis in both of the KPSS test
specifications. Stationarity tests were performed separately on the three datasets as the results could
change according to time series length. According to the stated criteria, all the variables in dataset A
(January 1996 to October 2003) are nonstationary in level (except for import milk price IPMA) and
stationary in first difference; all the variables in dataset B (January 2000 to October 2008) are I(1) in
level and I(0) in first difference; while all variables in the period covered by dataset AB (January 1996 to
October 2008) have a unit root in level (except for IPMA and IPMB) and are stationary in first difference.
The full results of the unit root tests are available upon request. This confirms, as suspected, that OLS
estimation is not a viable tool to perform the market power test; however, as almost all variables have
the same order of integration, I(1), another econometric strategy can be followed to detect for imperfect
competition along the fluid milk chain.
4.3. Estimation Strategy
Giving the non-stationarity of time series, estimation strategies other than OLS regression have to
be used to avoid spurious results. According to the Engle and Granger [65] representation theorem, if a
set of nonstationary variables share the same order of integration, there may be a variable constructed
by difference or linear combination that is stationary. If such a condition holds, the variables are said
to be cointegrated and they share a long-term relationship, whereas differences between them are
short-term errors. When some variables are cointegrated, an error correction model (ECM) can be
estimated, establishing a relationship between changes in one variable of the set (for our purposes the
dependent variable) with respect to long-term equilibrium with the other variables in the set. The ECM
splits such changes (errors) in a short-term component, which causes a departure from the long-term
equilibrium, and a long-term component, called the error correction term (ECT), which brings the
system back to equilibrium. The ECM thus allows for separate estimation of long-term and short-term
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relationships among nonstationary cointegrated variables, provided that such relationships are not
spurious and are statistically significant. The cointegrating vector is the set of parameter estimates
associated with the long-term component (ECT).
To estimate Equation (3) consistently in light of the aforementioned econometric theory, for each
dataset all the variables have been combined, looking for those combinations with one and only one
cointegrating vector, according to the Johansen cointegration test. The econometric package EViews 6
provided the automatic selection of lags for this test under five different assumptions concerning the
functional form of data and the cointegrating equation (CE):
1. No trend in data, no intercept and trend in the CE
2. No trend in data, intercept and no trend in the CE
3. Linear trend in data, no intercept and trend in the CE
4. Linear trend in data, intercept and trend in the CE
5. Quadratic trend in data, intercept and trend in the CE
Those combinations of variables showing one and only one cointegrating vector, under one or
more of the aforementioned assumptions, were tested for estimating an ECM. In doing so, all the
necessary restrictions (number of lags for each variable and functional form) were adopted for each
selected combination of variables to ensure one cointegrating vector only.
Note that such combinations of variables satisfy only the econometric conditions for the consistent
estimation of long-term relationships among variables; in addition, theoretical requirements regarding
the significance and sign of parameter estimates have to be fulfilled.
5. Results
Before showing the econometric results of the ECM estimation, it is useful to recall the necessary
conditions that parameter estimates of each variable should satisfy according to economic theory and
model prescriptions to test conclusively the competitive behaviour along the food chain:
• According to economic theory, producer price and marketing cost parameters should always be
positive and significantly different from zero (β1 > 0; β2 > 0); one could argue that this may not be
the case in the short term (because of asymmetric price transmission), however, ECM estimation
describes the long-term relationships among variables;
• To infer perfect competition along the food chain, supply and demand shifter parameters have to
simultaneously not be significantly different from zero (β3 = β4 = 0);
• To infer market power exertion along the food chain, the demand shifter parameter has to be
positive and significantly different from zero, while simultaneously the supply shifter parameter
has to be negative and significantly different from zero (β3 > 0; β4 < 0).
These conditions have to be met to obtain unambiguous conclusions in performing market
power tests and are then compared to the sign and significance of the explanatory variable parameter
estimates in the cointegrating vector. Such parameters describe the long-term equilibrium relationships
between the dependent variable (retail milk price) and each explanatory variable in the theoretical
model. Among all the combinations of I(1) variables showing one cointegrating vector, where possible,
those with parameters that are statistically significant and signed according to model prescriptions
will be presented, or at least those closest to such requirements.
For algebraic reasons, the t-values of explanatory variables have been multiplied by -1 to render
the cointegrating vector comparable to the parameters in Equation (3), normalizing with respect to the
dependent variable.
Table 2 reports the estimation results for dataset A (January 1996 to October 2003) in which all the
combinations presented are consistent with economic theory, indicating that consumer price is linked
by a significantly positive relationship to producer price and marketing costs (any other result would
be meaningless in the long term). The food demand shifter parameter is not significantly different
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from zero in the first four combinations, whereas it is significantly negative in the last one, failing to
satisfy the model prescriptions. The farm supply shifter is always negative and significant, pointing to
market power exertion during the period considered; however, this is not sufficient to reach such a
conclusion as the same coherence is simultaneously needed for both of the shifter parameters.
Table 2. Dataset A (January 1996–October 2003) ECM cointegrating vectors parameters [t values]
normalized with respect to retail price (91 observations, two lags in variables).
Expected signs with market power exertion
>0 >0 >0 <0
Expected signs with perfect competition











PMA MB DS SS2 SS3
5 2.226 10.432 DS2 2.936 −5.242 0.007
[4.915] [4.524] [0.811] [−3.55] - [2.655]
5 3.479 16.273 DS1 1.414 −7.734 0.004
[5.1667] [4.655] [0.268] [−3.511] - [2.588]
4 12.567 64.761 DS2 2.429 −31.254 0.001
[4.476] [4.530] [0.108] [−3.411] - [3.002]
4 5.554 26.914 DS1 0.519 −12.626 0.003
[5.03] [4.69] [0.060] [−3.494] - [2.706]
1 2.147 3.593 DS3 −2.089 −2.509 0.007
[4.039] [3.697] [−2.270] - [−3.311] [3.276]




Given the available data, for the period covered by dataset A, the test fails to detect any form
of imperfect competition along the fluid milk supply chain. Note that this does not point to perfect
competition in the marketing chain in the same period as the necessary conditions (non-significant
effects of both of the shifters on consumer price) are not achieved. In other words, the empirical results
do not provide any clear evidence of the conduct (perfect or imperfect competition) in the Italian fluid
milk chain over the period January 1996 to October 2003. This outcome may represent a weak point
for the proposed methodology as it was not able to provide conclusive results. On the other hand, this
(lack of) conclusion is compatible with the conclusions of the market monitoring action carried out by
the NCA between 1992 and 1994, which did not find enough evidence of anticompetitive behaviours
along the milk supply chain to justify an intervention.
Table 3 shows the t-values of the parameter estimates for dataset B (January 2000 to October
2008). It is worth remembering that combinations of variables that are apparently identical differ for
assumptions regarding data and the functional form of the cointegrating vector.
In the first four combinations, producer price is proxied by the import milk price; in such cases,
all the parameters are highly significant (at 1%) and signed as suggested by economic theory and
the theoretical model, detecting market power exertion along the supply chain during the period
examined. Similar indications come from the last five combinations of variables using the Ismea
producer milk price index (PMB) and the Istat producer animal price index (PAPB) as proxies. In the
regression including the PMB, all parameters are significant at 1% except for MA1 (marketing costs) at
2.5% significance. Regressions using the PAPB still show significant and “well-signed” parameters,
although the significance of marketing costs falls to 5%.
In the complex four, over nine presented combinations indicate with no doubt (1% significance)
that over the period January 2000 to October 2008 the Italian fluid milk supply chain was imperfectly
competitive in one or more of the vertically related markets. However, as mentioned earlier, with
the theoretical model adopted, it is not possible to identify at what level, on which side (demand or
supply) or to what extent market power was exerted.
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Table 3. Dataset B (January 2000–October 2008). ECM cointegrating vectors parameters [t values]
normalized with respect to retail.
Expected signs with market power exertion
>0 >0 >0 <0
Expected signs with perfect competition








MA1 MB DS3 SS2 SS4
3 IPMB 5.146 3.238 - 4.795 −6.307 - −0.002
[7.540] [4.391] [5.422] [−6.906] [−1.035]
3 IPMB 5.376 - 3.774 4.967 −6.585 - −0.002
[7.514] [4.359] [5.342] [−6.882] [−1.02]
4 IPMB 2.535 3.271 - 4.031 −3.708 - −0.002
[7.540] [3.457] [5.644] [−7.112] [−0.521]
4 IPMB 2.565 - 3.726 4.075 −3.757 - −0.002
[7.497] [3.434] [5.612] [−7.094] [−0.512]
4 PMB 0.122 0.269 - 1.273 - −0.186 −0.043
[3.423] [2.142] [14.657] [−5.641] [−0.882]
3 PAPB 0.268 - 0.146 1.014 - −0.210 −0.006
[3.128] [1.927] [11.671] [−5.814] [−0.155]
3 PAPB 0.265 0.129 - 1.015 - −0.209 −0.007
[3.081] [1.910] [11.701] [−5.776] [−0.175]
2 PAPB 0.262 - 0.145 1.015 - −0.210 0.011
[2.997] [1.885] [11.457] [−5.703] [0.298]
2 PAPB 0.259 0.129 - 1.016 - −0.209 0.010
[2.947] [1.868] [11.481] [−5.660] [0.275]




Table 4 reports the t-values of cointegrating vectors obtained from dataset AB (January 1996 to
October 2008), built up using a longer time series obtained by rebasing the original ones. The first
unexpected result is shown in the first four rows of the table, with the import price indices for milk
(IPMA and IPMB) being used as proxies of producer price. ECM estimation using such variables yields
the best results in terms of the sign and significance of long-term parameter estimates, thus indicating
market power exertion.
However, these variables should have been excluded from the set of time series used for empirical
estimation as they resulted in being stationary in level and first difference, I(0), according to three
different tests (ADF, PP and KPSS). Following relevant econometric theory, a cointegrating relationship
can be sought only among series sharing the same order of integration and, therefore, the results
obtained using stationary variables may be spurious
Note that the shorter and non-rescaled portions of IPMA and IPMB used in datasets A and B are
I(1) and it is thus plausible to infer some kind of modification in time series patterns induced by the
rebasing procedures. In any case, the ECM estimations using IPMA and IPMB are probably spurious,
and conclusions regarding market power detection based on them cannot be considered reliable.
Therefore, the results including IPMA and IPMB variables have been presented only to provide a more
complete picture of outcomes deriving from all the possible combinations of variables.
Among the other I(1) variables, however, there are combinations providing conclusive results
according to model prescriptions: The two cointegrating vectors with PAP1A and PAP1B (index
of animal product prices) as proxies of producer price yield parameter estimates that fulfil the
necessary conditions for the presence of imperfect competition along the food chain. All the other
combinations, with PM2A, PM3A PM4A and PM5A for producer price, have marketing cost parameters
not significantly different from zero. As this result is not plausible based on economic theory, no clear
conclusions can be drawn from these combinations of variables. In complex, only two cointegrating
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vectors have parameter estimates that are consistent, in sign and significance, with evidence of
anticompetitive behaviour at some stages of the fluid milk supply chain over the period January 1996
to October 2008.
Table 4. Dataset AB (January 1996–October 2008) ECM cointegrating vectors parameters [t values]
normalized with respect to retail price (149 observations. 4 lags in variables).
Expected signs with market power exertion
>0 >0 >0 <0















MB a DS3 SS2 a
4 IPMA 8.998 20.769 18.472 −15.840 0.000
[7.474] [5.477] [5.897] [−6.670] [0.421]
5 IPMA 12.443 28.438 24.831 −21.719 0.000
[7.440] [5.399] [5.706] [−6.589] [0.350]
4 IPMB 10.155 20.769 18.472 −15.840 0.000
[7.474] [5.477] [5.897] [−6.676] [0.421]
5 IPMB 14.042 28.438 24.831 −21.719 0.000
[7.439] [5.399] [5.706] [−6.589] [0.350]
3 PAP1A 0.491 0.538 0.925 −0.598 −0.007
[4.636] [3.708] [8.301] [−4.878] [−0.380]
3 PAP1B 0.438 0.513 0.879 −0.494 −0.019
[4.313] [3.635] [7.958] [−4.553] [−0.930]
3 PM3A 0.076 0.099 1.095 −0.141 −0.048
[1.597] [1.149] [15.56] [−1.889] [−1.993]
3 PM4A 0.071 0.080 1.104 -0.135 −0.046
[1.464] [0.934] [15.47] [−1.750] [−1.928]
3 PM2A 0.069 0.077 1.106 −0.134 −0.046
[1.435] [0.890] [15.45] [−1.720] [−1.916]
3 PM5A 0.066 0.064 1.111 −0.128 −0.045
[1.340] [0.743] [15.38] [−1.620] [−1.877]





a MA1 and SS1 show the same values of MB and SS2, respectively.
To sum up, the empirical analysis detected market power exertion along the Italian fluid milk
supply chain in two of the three periods examined (January 2000 to October 2008 and January 1996
to October 2008), while no conclusive results may be drawn about the degree of competition along
the fluid milk chain over the period 1996–2003. In order to avoid confusion in the reader, it is worth
remembering that Tables 3 and 4 report both conclusive evidence of market power exertion and
non-conclusive results. The co-existence of such outcomes does not represent a contradiction, as the
absence of clear evidence of market power (that is, the rejection of the null hypothesis reported in
Equation (5)) does not imply perfect competition. The strategy of using more time series as proxies
of each variable was necessary to ensure a sufficient combination of variables with the same order of
integration, one cointegrating vector and parameter estimates with sign and significance in line with
the theoretical model prescription.
6. Discussion and Concluding Comments
This paper aims to make an empirical contribution to competition analysis of the food supply
chain, applying a theoretical framework that yields conclusive results on market power exertion using
easily available data. For this reason, such an approach may be used as a “first pass” test [11] to
check for the presence of imperfect competition along the supply chain, before applying more complex
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and data-intensive methods to measure the extent of market power in each vertically related market.
Such a combination and integration of methods can be a useful tool for improving the efficiency of
competition policy analysis, as suggested by Digal and Ahmadi-Esfahani [5] and, more recently, by
Lloyd [6]. In this context, the aim of this contribution is twofold: firstly, to compare empirical findings
on market power exertion on the Italian fluid milk supply chain with the conclusion of Antitrust
investigation on the same domain, carried out over a previous period. Secondly, in doing so, to uncover
empirical and theoretical issues emerging during the process to provide useful hints and suggestions
for model improvement and future research.
The imperfect competition test has pointed out the exercise of market power at some stage of
the Italian fluid milk supply chain over the period 1996–2008, although no conclusions can be drawn
for the period 1996–2003. This evidence is consistent with the results of Madau et al. [57] that found
evidence of imperfect competition in the same food chain over the period 2000–2013. It should be
noted that the absence of clear evidence of market power does not imply perfect competition as in the
latter case neither demand nor supply shifters should affect the retail price. Such lack of clarity in the
findings is, however, compatible with the conclusions of the 1992–1994 market monitoring action by
the Italian NCA.
From a methodological viewpoint, this empirical exercise has provided evidence of some
peculiarities and limitations of the market power test implemented. Although this approach can yield
conclusive indications regarding the conduct of food supply chains (whereas APT studies cannot),
in some cases it may not be possible to obtain unambiguous results because of the combination of
econometric and model prescription requirements. From the econometric side, only those combinations
of variables with the same order of integration and one, and only one, cointegrating vector can be
used for estimating the ECM, whereas economic theory considers plausible only those results in which
producer price and marketing cost have a positive effect on the retail price. However, the fulfilment
of the aforementioned necessary conditions does not ensure the conclusiveness of the market power
test as model prescriptions point to market power along the food chain only with positive demand
and (simultaneously) negative supply shifters or to perfect competition when both of the shifters
are (simultaneously) not statistically significant in their parameter estimates. Such combinations of
conditions suggest the use of more time series approximating each variable of the model to obtain
more combinations of variables that in turn increase the probability of attaining a clear result (market
power exertion or perfect competition along the food chain). This is the strategy followed in this paper,
but unfortunately it may make the implementation of the market power test more complex, harming,
in part, one of its advantages over the NEIO structural models. In this regard, a viable alternative,
and/or a useful complemental fool may be represented by the empirical approach developed by Grau
and Hockmann, [46].
Along with such caveats, the empirical application of the model suggests many aspects for its
improvement. A crucial point pertains to the validation of the theoretical model employed in the
analysis; indeed, the possible empirical outcomes (presence/absence of market power or inconclusive
results) neither contradict nor confirm the validity of the underlying theoretical framework, as
counterfactual evidence is missing. There are two main ways of obtaining such evidence: setting up
Monte Carlo simulations or analysing each stage (market) of the supply chain using structural models.
The first approach has also been used to validate some NEIO models [66,67] and would provide
more general results as they allow the simulation of vertically related markets (having different a
priori determined levels of conduct at each stage) on which to perform the market power test. Such
simulated supply chains would yield data (prices, marketing costs and shifters) used in the market
power test. The model would be validated if the market power test yielded results in line with the
conduct imposed in the simulated supply chain examined. The second way would consist of analysing
the same supply chain over the same time span with a set of NEIO models and the market power
test, and then comparing the estimations yielded by the former to the results of the latter. In this case,
clearly the validation would be confined to the supply chain analysed and a certain amount of effort
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would be required to examine oligopolisitic power (on the supply side) and oligopsonistic power
(on the demand side) in each stage of the food chain examined with a battery of subsequent structural
models. The latter aspect could be made simpler and more flexible in part by using a multi-stage
structural model (such as in Moro et al. [45]). Another aspect subject to improvement concerns variable
choice: Where possible, homogeneity in data sources (and then in meta-data) would be desirable,
a condition that is not met in this study (different sources of producer price and retail price) and that, in
general, is out of the researcher’s control when using publicly-available datasets. Using data obtained
through different methodologies may result in a sort of within-variable error that in turn reduces the
statistical significant of ECM estimates. Estimation results may also be harmed by potentially omitted
variable biases in marketing costs and demand and supply shifters. Using a single proxy for these
model variables may be misleading (as the supply shifter is a producer price index it is less affected
by such criticism.) as such a proxy cannot capture their true effect on retail prices. Using composite
indices may address this issue: For instance a “weighted marketing cost index” could account for all
input costs (not only wages) in the food chain, whereas a “demand shifter index” may include more
variables affecting product demand and agricultural policy effects may be plugged into a “supply
shifter index”. It should be noted that addressing such data issues may improve the efficiency of the
market power test, thus reducing its main limitation.
A further suggestion for model improvement may be undertaken on the theoretical side, relaxing
the fixed proportion technology assumption (input–output coefficient = 1) while retaining the empirical
testing framework. Such relaxation is necessary to apply the market power test for supply chains
with different technological conditions and more importantly, to use it at a more aggregated level,
looking for market power exertion at the agrifood system level and then for macro groups of food
chains (animal products, crop products) following a “general to particular” approach.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Variables included in dataset A and descriptive statistics (common sample January 1996–October 2003, 94 observations).
Variable Abbrev Data Description Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Skew Kurt
Retail Milk price RM1 Consumer Price Index: milk 111.505 108.000 124.100 102.400 6.455 0.707 1.982
Produc. Milk Price PMA Producer Price Index: cow milk 99.312 98.210 110.520 92.100 5.241 0.592 2.598
Produc. Anim Price PAPA Producer price Index: animal products 104.144 104.900 111.900 93.900 3.865 −0.324 2.896
Import Produc. Milk IPMA Index of milk import price from EU 25 109.125 107.949 122.363 100.387 5.394 0.662 2.616
Marketing Shifter MA1 Index of wages, dairy processing sector 109.694 109.800 120.524 100.000 5.437 0.048 2.223
Marketing Shifter MB Index of wages, dairy processing sector 98.312 98.400 108.000 89.600 4.888 0.044 2.210
Demand Shifter DS1 Consumer Price Index: general index 112.004 111.050 122.700 102.500 5.817 0.252 1.844
Demand Shifter DS2 Consumer Price Ind: general index-no tobacco 111.946 110.950 122.600 102.400 5.842 0.253 1.822
Demand Shifter DS3 Consumer Price Index: food, wines and spirits 108.911 106.250 121.300 102.200 5.447 0.781 2.167
Supply Shifter SS1 producer price index for dairy farms 103.322 102.915 109.345 98.220 2.949 0.254 1.741
Supply Shifter SS2 producer price index for dairy farms 106.757 106.336 112.981 101.485 3.047 0.254 1.741
Supply Shifter SS3 producer price index for dairy farms 97.629 98.245 104.590 90.410 3.014 −0.354 2.822
Table A2. Variables included in dataset B and descriptive statistics (common sample January 2000–October 2008, 106 observations).
Variable Abbrev Data Description Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Skew Kurt
Retail Milk price RM1 Consumer Price Index: milk 124.023 124.750 144.100 108.000 8.600 0.357 3.254
Produc. Milk Price PMB Producer Price Index: cow milk 102.371 99.198 124.008 93.747 6.926 1.292 4.109
Produc. Anim Price PAPB Producer price Index—animal products 103.786 102.400 116.700 98.500 4.408 1.571 4.711
Import Produc. Milk IPMB Index of milk import price from EU 25 95.904 94.471 114.840 86.361 6.956 0.654 2.539
Marketing Shifter MA1 Index of wages, dairy processing sector 123.411 123.872 140.612 109.800 9.501 0.233 1.811
Marketing Shifter MB Index of wages, dairy processing sector 110.601 111.000 126.000 98.400 8.500 0.234 1.815
Demand Shifter DS1 Consumer Price Index: general index 124.196 124.700 138.000 111.300 7.321 0.026 1.978
Demand Shifter DS2 Consumer Price Ind: general index-no tobacco 123.945 124.500 137.400 111.200 7.113 0.011 2.016
Demand Shifter DS3 Consumer Price Index: food, wines and spirits 120.397 121.900 136.300 106.200 7.636 −0.001 2.486
Supply Shifter SS1 producer price index for dairy farms 112.957 111.361 133.712 100.826 8.665 1.033 3.167
Supply Shifter SS2 producer price index for dairy farms 116.713 115.063 138.158 104.179 8.953 1.033 3.167
Supply Shifter SS4 producer price index for dairy farms 107.909 103.352 135.272 96.857 10.188 1.363 3.808
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Table A3. Variables included in Dataset AB and descriptive statistics (common sample January 1996–October 2008, 154 observations).
Variable Abbrev Data description Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Skew Kurt
Retail Milk price RM1 Consumer Price Index: milk 118.526 119.250 144.100 102.400 10.879 0.412 2.341
Produc. Milk Price PM1A Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled 98.707 95.730 118.742 89.766 6.552 0.986 3.291
Produc. Milk Price PM2A Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled 98.820 95.730 119.095 90.033 6.549 1.023 3.389
Produc. Milk Price PM3A Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled 98.254 95.230 117.331 88.699 6.596 0.829 2.933
Produc. Milk Price PM4A Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled 98.725 95.730 118.797 89.808 6.552 0.992 3.306
Produc. Milk Price PM5A Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled 99.133 95.811 120.070 90.770 6.556 1.122 3.670
Produc. Milk Price PM1B Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled 103.084 99.796 124.008 93.747 6.940 0.954 3.139
Produc. Milk Price PM2B Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled 102.987 99.796 124.008 93.747 6.913 0.964 3.185
Produc. Milk Price PM3B Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled 103.476 100.120 124.008 93.747 7.077 0.911 2.965
Produc. Milk Price PM4B Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled 103.069 99.796 124.008 93.747 6.935 0.956 3.146
Produc. Milk Price PM5B Producer Price Index: cow milk—rescaled 102.723 99.796 124.008 93.747 6.855 0.988 3.317
Produc. Anim Price PAP1A Produc. Pric. Ind.: animal products—rebas 105.280 104.702 119.557 93.900 4.817 0.901 4.367
Produc. Anim Price PAP1B Produc. price Index: anim products, rebas 103.027 102.495 116.700 91.656 4.682 0.762 4.243
Import Produc. Milk IPMA Index of milk import price from EU 25 107.960 106.861 129.599 97.461 6.840 0.783 3.219
Import Produc. Milk IPMB Index of milk import price from EU 25 95.665 94.691 114.840 86.361 6.061 0.783 3.219
Marketing Shifter MA1 Index of wages, dairy processing sector 117.786 115.250 140.612 100.000 11.632 0.376 1.979
Marketing Shifter MB Index of wages, dairy processing sector 105.557 103.350 126.000 89.600 10.421 0.373 1.980
Demand Shifter DS1 Consumer Price Index: general index 118.864 118.650 138.000 102.500 10.083 0.125 1.784
Demand Shifter DS2 Consumer Price Ind: general index-no tobacco 118.664 118.700 137.400 102.400 9.919 0.101 1.780
Demand Shifter DS3 Consumer Price Index: food, wines and spirits 115.478 115.900 136.300 102.200 9.700 0.287 1.879
Supply Shifter SS1 producer price index for dairy farms 109.210 106.583 133.712 98.220 9.123 1.169 3.656
Supply Shifter SS2 producer price index for dairy farms 112.841 110.127 138.158 101.485 9.427 1.169 3.656
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Appendix B. Derivation of the Theoretical Model
Here is shown the full derivation of the theoretical model presented in Section 3.
Let us take a food supply chain that faces, on the consumer side, an inverse demand function:
x = D(Px, N) (A1)
where x is the quantity of food products sold, Px is the consumer price and N is an exogenous food
demand shifter. At the first stage of the chain, the raw agricultural product is sold according to a
supply function:
Pa = h(a, W) (A2)
where Pa is the farm gate price of the raw agricultural product, a is the quantity sold and W is an
exogenous shifter of the farm supply function. As previously mentioned, the intermediate food
processing and retailing stage is seen as the most likely source of market power and thus its behaviour
is explicitly modelled using a profit function of the i-th firm:
pii = Px(x)xi − Pa(a)ai − Ci(xi) (A3)
where pii, xi and ai are, respectively, profit, quantity of food sold and quantity of raw agricultural
product bought by the i-th firm and Ci are costs not associated with the agricultural product.
Furthermore, for this stage of the food chain, a constant return to scale and fixed proportion technology





where ρ is an input–output coefficient that equals one. This assumption imposes a limitation on the















To obtain an explicit solution to (A5) under the previous assumptions, the agricultural supply
(A2) and food demand (A1) functions are linearized as follows:
x = D− bPx + cN (A6)
Pa = h + gS (A7)
in which S is the food product supplied in a country that is in turn composed by:
S = xi +W (A8)
where the exogenous shifter W that appears in (A2) is the level of exports. Using (A6)–(A8), the
profit-maximizing conditions (A5) can be rewritten allowing for the exertion of oligopolistic and
oligopsonistic power by the intermediate stage of the food chain:
Px − θb x = M + Pa + µgx (A9)
with θ and µ representing, respectively, oligopolistic and oligopsonistic conduct parameters
(See Section 2.2 on new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) structural models for an explanation of
conduct parameters.) ranging from 0 (perfect competition) to 1 (monopoly—monopsonistic behaviour),
where the former represents the behaviour of the processing-retailing stage in the product (food)
market, while the latter embodies its conduct in buying (raw agricultural) factor. When the food
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supply chain is perfectly competitive, both parameters equal 0, while departures from this benchmark
are associated with increasing values up to 1.
Although these parameters are widely used in the NEIO literature to estimate the extent of
imperfect competition, in this context, they are used only as instruments to signal collusive behaviour.
The variable M, which appears in Equation (A9), represents all the non-agricultural costs
that determine the extent of the marketing margin (Px − Pa). M thus contains both fixed and
variable components:
M = y + zE (A10)
where y is a fixed cost component and zE represents variable costs associated with non-agricultural
inputs (e.g., labour costs for processing and retailing). The previous Equations (A6), (A7), (A9), and
(A10) are employed as a set to represent endogenous variables in the explicit form:
x =
(D− by− bh) + cN − bzE− bgW
(1+ θ) + bg(1+ µ)
(A11)
Px =
D + [(1+ θ) + (bg(1+ µ)] · [(1− b)(y + h + gW) + (1− bz)E + cN]
(1+ θ) + bg(1+ µ)
(A12)
M = y + zEPa =
g[(k− by + cN − bzE]− g{b− [(1+ θ) + bg(1+ µ)](h +W)}
(1+ θ) + bg(1+ µ)
(A13)
By subtracting Equation (A12) from Equation (A13) and rearranging, it is possible to make explicit
the marketing margin (Px − Pa):
Px − Pa =
D( θb + gµ) + (1+ bg)(y + zE) + (
θ
b + gµ)cN − (θ + bgµ)(h + gW)
(1+ θ) + bg(1+ µ)
(A14)
Equation (A14) derived here corresponds to Equation (1) presented in Section 3 of the main text.
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